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V Á C L A V  H A V E L ,  J A N  P A T O Č K A ;  T H E  P O W E R L E S S  
A N D  T H E  S H A K E N  
[ O r i g i n a l l y  p u b l i s h e d  i n  S y m p o s i u m  V o l  1 8  N o .  2  
2 0 1 4 ]  
 
D a n i e l  B r e n n a n  ( B o n d  U n i v e r s i t y )  
 
Václav Havel passed away in December of 2011, leaving behind a legacy that is 
yet to be fully appreciated. Besides his career in drama and his extraordinary political 
trajectory from leading dissident to President of Czechoslovakia and then the Czech 
Republic, Havel also wrote on matters of philosophy. It is to this that I will turn my 
attention in this paper, as this has been largely overlooked in the immediate wake of 
his death. My claim essentially is that Havel’s concept of living in truth is heavily 
influenced by a call for dissent made by his mentor, the phenomenologist Jan Patočka, 
which he makes in the last essay of his Heretical Essays, “Wars of the Twentieth 
Century and The Twentieth Century as War”. Here I will explain how Patočka’s paper 
informs the philosophy of Václav Havel, especially in his work, “The Power of the 
Powerless,” which is Havel’s most famous essay. But more importantly I will carve 
out a space where Havel can be assessed on his own merits, that is, not merely as a 
vehicle for Patočka’s ideas, but a presenter of his own. 
Jan Patočka’s contributions to philosophy are mainly in the tradition of 
phenomenology. An excellent intellectual biography of Patočka is provided by 
Erazim Kohák.1 Kohák writes that Patočka is best understood as an heir of Edmund 
Husserl, who Patočka worked closely with from 1933 whilst Husserl was working on 
the critique of subjectivity and technology that is contained in The Crisis of the 
                                                          
1 Erazim Kohák, Jan Patočka: Philosophy and Selected Writings, (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1989). Hereafter referred to parenthetically in the text as JP. 
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European Sciences.2  Patočka, whilst studying under Husserl, also attended lectures 
by Heidegger and hence there is a strong presence of Heidegger’s work in his 
philosophy as well. The third major figure that would help to situate Patočka is the 
towering figure in Czech history of Tomáš Masaryk.(JP, 10) Both Masaryk and 
Husserl had diagnosed a state of crisis in contemporary Europe, but both thinkers had 
different approaches to the problem. As Kohák notes, Masaryk turned to an objective 
sense of truth in order to infuse meaning and order into the cosmos whereas Husserl, 
exploring the manner in which objectivity is only meaningful in subjective 
experience, finds a phenomenological analysis of subjective experience to be the key 
to recovering from the pitfalls of scientism.(JP, 13) Patočka, conversely, engages with 
both philosophical solutions and Kohák claims that his later philosophy represents a 
synthesis of Masaryk’s objectivism and Husserl’s analysis of subjectivity.   
That Havel’s philosophy owes a debt to Patočka is not a new theme. Edward 
Findlay explains that a reading of Havel’s philosophical writings is heavily 
illuminated by understanding something of Patočka’s philosophy first.3 Findlay is not 
friendly to Havel’s thought, however, claiming that it lacks the rigour of Patočka. This 
is a claim which at first glance seems correct, but is, I maintain, not fair to the depth 
and breadth of Havel’s thought. Hence a further exploration of this link is vital to 
fully appreciating Havel’s legacy. It is my contention that Havel gives an 
interpretation of Patočka’ philosophy which is more politically engaged than that 
found in Patočka’s writings. In other words, Havel lifts Patočka’s thought out of the 
theoretical and strives for an understanding of how Patočka’s ideas on dissent can be 
utilised practically. The result is something new and unique and well worth exploring. 
                                                          
2 Edmund Husserl, The Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, trans. 
David Carr, (Evanston: Northwesern University press, 1970). 
3 Edward Findlay “Classical Ethics and Postmodern Critique: Political Philosophy in Václav Havel and 
Jan Patočka”, The Review of Politics, vol.61, no.3 (1999): 403-438.  Hereafter referred to 
parenthetically in the text as CE. 
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Havel brings to the table a rigour for exploring concrete political realities and he 
leaves behind the analysis of history that marks Patočka’s thinking. I will argue here 
that what Havel offers is a political philosophy that is rooted in Patočka’s thinking, 
yet essentially Havelian. Havel’s life, of course, is the life of a politically engaged 
dissident and politician and hence it is no surprise that his writing is about concrete 
and present political issues; but that is not dismiss his writings as simply a reflection 
of his life. Havel brings to political philosophy a unique understanding of the role of 
ideology in politics and a unique understanding of how ideology can be overcome. 
The second part of this paper will demonstrate that uniqueness. 
Patočka’s writing on dissent begins in his philosophical look at the history of the 
twentieth century. For Patočka, the defining events of the twentieth century were the 
two world wars, brought on as a result of revolutionary Germany’s industrialisation of 
warfare, and the playing out of the idea, represented in the philosophy of Nietzsche, 
that meaning is superfluous to power.4 Patočka argues that the First World War’s 
creation of the front line is a disgusting result of technology influencing warfare. The 
terrible conditions in the trenches were compounded and necessitated by massive 
increases in fire power. Patočka calls the front line of WWI “absurdity par 
excellence” (HE, 126) — the space where everything that is valued by humanity is 
destroyed. The result of this is the creation of a desire to follow any leader or idea that 
promises to make the possibility of the front line disappear. This desire led, in 
Patočka’s eyes, to a transformation of the will to war from fighting for a result to 
fighting for peace. The Second World War can be understood in this context. With the 
increase in industrialisation and technological sophistication, the front of the Second 
World War is less easily defined. It impinges upon the homes of ordinary, non-
                                                          
4 Jan Patočka, Heretical Essays in the Philosophy of History, (tr.) Erazim Kohák, (ed.) James Dodd, 
(Illinois: Open Court, 1996). Hereafter referred to parenthetically in the text as HE. 
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enlisted citizens and thereby becomes an experience for anybody. Running with 
Patočka’s analysis, we can claim that with the development of nuclear weapons, that 
war becomes a constant and immediate possibility. It could start and finish before 
most are informed of it. War in recent times can be hot, cold or smouldering. With 
war being fought in different modes, it is hard to tell when war begins or ends, if it 
ends at all. The demobilisation of Europe after World War II, for Patočka, has not 
made for a state of peace in the sense that war is not present. Instead war has 
appropriated peace into itself. This appropriation is, for Patočka, perhaps more cruel 
than hot war, as peace has become an instrument of war. Patočka writes, 
We continue to be fascinated by force, allow it to lead us along its 
paths making us its dupes. Where we believe we have mastered it 
and can depend on it for security, we are in reality in a state of 
demobilisation and are losing the war which has cunningly changed 
its visage but has not ceased. (HE, 132)  
 
Life desires peace, but for Patočka, life’s attachment to force creates the will to 
war, hence within life there is a tendency for war. (HE, 128) What is most interesting 
about Patočka’s descriptions of the two world wars and the logos of the twentieth 
century is his assertion that the Second World War did not result in peace, but a 
continued state of war, not war as traditionally understood, but a kind of war-like state 
nonetheless. This state is a war of economics where, although in appearance a state of 
demobilization, there are mobilized “armies of workers, researchers, and engineers” 
and all work to the beat of the state’s drum. 
Patočka asks if the demobilisation of Europe and the gradual disappearance of 
systematic terror at extremes such as with Stalinism, represent a true demobilisation, 
5 
 
or a “cynical demobilisation” where individuals are forced to make a separation 
between truth and the public realm, as they are mobilised into obedience with new 
forms of power. (HE, 130) Patočka anticipates here some of the major themes of 
critical theorists and their analysis of bureaucracy and industrialisation of modern 
lives. However, what is quite remarkable in this analysis is Patočka’s insistence that it 
is through confronting the reality of the front, rather than running to life, that true 
demobilisation can be possible. Patočka locates power, or more accurately, freedom, 
in “the solidarity of the shaken.” The shaken are those who can translate a certain kind 
of freedom which Patočka locates in the WW1 front line combatant into the 
combatant in the demobilised war for peace. 
Patočka draws on the experiences of the front of Ernst Jünger5 and Pierre Teilhard 
de Chardin.6 Both writers described a sense of transcendence in their front line 
experience. Jünger noted that the front was an experience of transcendence from what 
one previously was — that is, one cannot retreat from what one is taking part in. 
Patočka quotes Teilhard de Chardin to describe this transcendence. 
The front is not simply a flaming line where the accumulated energies of 
hostile masses are released and mutually neutralized. It is also the locus of a 
distinctive Life shared only by those who dare step right up to it and only for 
as long as they dare remain there. It seems to me that one could show the front 
is not simply a line of fire, the interface of people attacking each other, but it is 
also in some way the “crest of a wave” that bears the world of humans toward 
its new destiny. (HE 125)  
 
                                                          
5 Ernst Jünger was a German novelist and essayist famous for his conservative outlook, which some 
consider to be sympathetic to fascism. 
6 Teilhard de Chardin was a French Jesuit philosopher who wrote on his experiences of the front line in 
World War 1. 
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This destiny, Patočka writes, is the destruction of the world which was horrible 
enough to create this front line in the first place. (HE, 125) The force which created 
the war uses the soldier’s lives as a kind of statistics of peace. It is symptomatic of a 
technological society which measures life, and calculates the good. The soldiers die at 
the front in the service of peace. The sacrifice is celebrated by those at home, for 
whom the aims of life are still paramount, just think of the repeated line “lest we 
forget” said at every ANZAC day memorial — because of our attachment to life we 
are told, these soldiers must die.7 WW1 was hence, in a perverse way for Patočka, a 
war for peace. 
For Patočka, what is useful about the front is the complete suspension of 
involvement in the world to take part in the events immediately at hand — “freedom 
from all the interests of peace, of life, of the day.” Day and night are two symbols in 
the Heretical Essays for life and death. Both are equally a part of the human 
condition, yet we turn more to the day, ignoring the night. War, as the experience of 
the night, is an experience of something as equally human as life. Patočka writes that 
the front line combatant, in turning towards the night manifests a terrible freedom: 
This absolute freedom is the understanding that here something has 
already been achieved, something that is not the means to anything 
else, a stepping stone to..., but rather something above and beyond 
which there can be nothing. This is the culmination, this self-
surrender which can call humans away from their vocations, talents, 
                                                          
7 On April 25th Australia celebrates a national public holiday commemorating Australia’s involvement 
in World War One, specifically a battle in Turkey which sustained many Australian casualties. The 
Australian War Memorial claims that ANZAC day celebrates the spirit that Australian soldier exhibited 
in World War One, and continue to exhibit in conflict today. “The spirit of ANZAC, with its human 
qualities of courage, mateship, and sacrifice, continues to have meaning and relevance for our sense of 
national identity.” The death of soldiers in the combat is portrayed as a sacrifice that gave Australia a 
national identity. See Australian War Memorial “ANZAC Day”, 
http://www.awm.gov.au/commemoration/anzac/ (Accessed 11/8/2012). 
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possibilities, their future. To be capable of that, to be chosen and 
called for it in a world that uses conflict to mobilize force so that it 
comes to appear as a totally objectified and objectifying cauldron of 
energy also means to overcome force. (HE, 130) 
 
Patočka is arguing that the motives that led to the front, are consumed in the front. 
The danger of the front, coupled with the immense freedom of the front, negates the 
will to life that created the conditions for the front in the first place.  
All everydayness, all visions of future life pale before the simple 
peak on which humans find themselves standing. In face of that, all 
the ideas of socialism, of progress, of democratic spontaneity, of 
independence and freedom appear impoverished, neither viable nor 
tangible. (HE, 130) 
 
For Patočka, the willingness to sacrifice one’s life at the front is traceable to a 
Christian appropriation of pre-history’s understanding of the necessity of death, and 
Plato’s taming of death with the immortal soul and Christianity’s appropriation of 
this. (HE, 130) Patočka is scathing  of those who would accept everydayness in its 
givenness: “Humankind will not attain peace by devoting and surrendering itself to 
the criteria of everydayness and of its promises. All who betray this solidarity must 
realise that they are sustaining war and are the parasites on the sidelines who live off 
the blood of others.” (HE, 135)8 This is one of the rare times that Patočka makes a 
judgement so boldly. Normally such a strict practitioner of the phenomenological 
                                                          
8 Ibid., 135. 
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method, this political statement is full of pathos and is directed squarely at those who 
are participating in the state of war Patočka points to. 
If the wars could produce this kind of freedom, then why have they not made any 
lasting peace? Lubica Ucnik gives the following answer from her reading of Patočka: 
Peace has become nothing more than war fought with other means, 
“appealing to the will to live and to have”. Leaving their front experiences 
behind, survivors accept that life is geared only towards things, life of 
consumerism: carpe deim, enjoy the pleasures of the moment without 
concern for the future! Not life in itself, but things make life pleasurable.9  
  
In other words, the war continues on, in a demobilized form, using ordinary citizens 
as peaceful combatants, in a war of economics. Citizens are persuaded that happiness 
lies in consumerism. Consider political rhetoric in the War on Terror. On October 11 
2001, one month after the September 11 attacks on the World trade Centre buildings 
in New York, then President George W. Bush announced “Now, the American people 
have got to go about their business. We cannot let the terrorists achieve the objective 
of frightening our nation to the point where we don't — where we don't conduct 
business, where people don’t shop. That’s their intention.”10 The normal activity of a 
U.S. citizen is hence defined as consuming. Any actual combat is far from our shores, 
and used as evidence that our (consumerist) way of life is superior for attaining 
eudemonia. Political rhetoric maintains that soldiers in the far away middle east are 
making a sacrifice for our way of life. The former Australian Prime Minister John 
Howard, in committing troops to the invasion of Iraq, argued that the invasion of Iraq 
                                                          
9 Lubica Ucnik. “Patočka on Techno-Power and the Sacrificial Victim”, in Jan Patočka and the 
Heritage of Phenomenology: Centenary Papers, (ed.) Ivan Chvatik and Erika Abrams, (New York: 
Springer, 2011): 195-196. 
10 White House Archive, “President Holds Prime Time News Conference” October 11, 2001, 
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/10/20011011-7.html  
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was in the national interest.11 The current Prime Minister Julia Gillard has argued that 
Australia has a military presence in Afghanistan so that it does not again become a 
training ground for Al Qaeda who conspire to kill westerners there.12 Again, we are 
made to feel that the things of this world are worth the war’s continuation.  
The contemporary front, for Patočka, is a battle of logos. Those who suspend the 
given, who escape the ordinary everydayness and realise human freedom, have a 
responsibility to speak, Patočka writes, “like Socrates daimonion” in warnings and 
prohibitions. (HE, 135)13 I mention Patočka’s use of the Socratic term daimonion 
because it appears to me that Patočka is referring to the wisdom that appears to come 
from outside of the cave to refer to Plato’s allegory illuminating the inside of the cave. 
Socrates’ inner voice speaks with divinity, but refers to the mundane. It is for Patočka 
the voice of freedom. In a demobilized age still in the mode of war, Patočka again 
urges strife in the form of warning and dissent against whatever regime or form of 
force is manipulating human being. This is a rare explicit incitement to action in 
Patočka’s work. In the sixth essay of the Heretical Essays, Patočka urges action in the 
present through recapturing logos by renouncing whatever meaning one already has 
been given. 
Patočka, as mentioned, talks of “the solidarity of the shaken,” the shaken are those 
who understand that they can say no to the forces which make this state of war 
continuous. Those who can recapture the freedom of the front and bring the historical 
situation into doubt effect change. Patočka claims:  
The solidarity of the shaken is built up in persecution and uncertainty: that 
is its front line, quiet, without fanfare or sensation even there where this 
                                                          
11 “Howard Commits Troops to War”, in Sydney Morning Herald March 18, 2003, 
http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2003/03/18/1047749732511.html 
12 “Gillard Begins Debate on War” Australian Financial Review, October 19, 2010, 
http://afr.com/p/national/gillard_begins_debate_on_war_i0E3BgbqAIAK46EYsxq7PO 
13 Ibid., 135. 
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ruling Force seeks to seize it. It does not fear being unpopular but seeks it 
out and calls out wordlessly. Humankind will not attain peace by devoting 
and surrendering itself to the criteria of everydayness and its promises. 
(HE, 135)  
 
Patočka then invokes Heraclitus whom he claims saw his idea of war, that is, a 
struggle for freedom, as a divine law which sustained life. Patočka calls this the will 
to the freedom of risk in the aristeia. The aristeia is the scene in an epic work where 
the hero has their finest moment, for example, Achilles kills Hector. Essentially 
Patočka is asking people, in order  to achieve real peace, to risk their comfort, to be a 
sacrifice not for the things of life, but for life itself, to choose not to live if living 
means not living with the Good. Patočka is not advocating martyrdom, because the 
irrational death of the martyr, for glory, or for however many virgins, forgets that we 
are finite human beings that are not reducible to calculable and therefore controllable 
beings; this brings a sense that life is meaningful when lived in other ways. Patočka 
means living responsibly, responsible for ourselves, and for others, and for the world, 
because life is not about living in the sacrifice of others, nor of consuming finite 
resources.  
The solidarity of the shaken and their emphasis on sacrifice for responsibility, I 
take to be the driving idea behind Václav Havel’s influential essay ‘The Power of the 
Powerless’. This essay is an attempt to supply meaning to dissent in order to 
overcome the oppressive power of ideology. I will from here demonstrate how 
reading Patočka’s thoughts on the solidarity of the shaken can illuminate an 
understanding of Havel’s essay, and how Havel has moved past Patočka. 
11 
 
In the two book length studies of Havel, by James Sire, and James Pontuso 
respectively, there has been no mention made of the link between ‘The Power of the 
Powerless’ and the final Heretical Essay. Edward Findlay, in his discussion of the 
link between Havel and Patočka is explicit that Havel’s essay is related to Patočka’s 
essay; but his analysis is, as already stated, unfair to Havel. Findlay writes that Havel 
merely echoes the themes of Patocka’s analysis. (CE, 407) Aviezer Tucker only 
mentions that ‘The Power of the Powerless is an encounter with Patocka’.14  Hence a 
further analysis of the link between these essays is important. 
Findlay claims that Havel’s thought can only be considered in light of Patočka’s 
work. (CE, 403) He also criticises Havel for not being the rigorous philosopher that 
Patočka was. For Findlay, there is no political philosophy in Havel’s works, just a 
spattering of themes which resonate with political readers.(CE, 404) I think this is 
unfair to Havel. There is a key difference between Havel’s and Patočka’s critique of 
ideology which separates Havel and delineates him as an original thinker, which is the 
removal of Patočka’s philosophy of history from Patočka’s critique of ideology. The 
key question driving Patočka’s critique of ideology, as is well noted by Derrida, is 
“why does [Europe] suffer from ignorance of its history, from a failure to assume its 
responsibility, that is, the memory of its history as history of responsibility?”15  The 
Heretical Essays aim to give a philosophical explanation to the problems of historicity 
from Patočka’s view that historicity removes the possibility of man being a historical 
construction. The Heretical Essays are heretical precisely because they allow the 
reader to rupture with history to have better access to history, that is to momentarily 
step out of historicity and be responsible for history. On the other hand, Havel, whilst 
                                                          
14 Avazier Tucker, The Philosophy and Politics of Czech Dissidence from Patočka to Havel, 
(Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2000). 
15 Jacques Derrida, The Gift of Death, 2nd Ed., (tr.) David Wills, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2008), 10. 
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sharing Patočka’s Heideggerian conception of Being, does not share Patočka’s 
valuation of the philosophy of history. Instead, Havel’s philosophy is a markedly 
more dissident philosophy. Where Patočka elaborates on the historical concealing of 
Being, Havel elaborates on the possibility of uncovering in the present. In his essay to 
commemorate the twentieth anniversary of the Prague Spring, “Farce, Reformability, 
and the Future of the World” Havel, instead of describing the historical formulations 
of ideology, explains the historical attempts to disrupt ideology. Rather than explain 
the Hungarian Revolution, Prague Spring, Khrushchev’s thaw and many other 
individual attempts to upset totalitarian regimes as separate historical occurrences, 
Havel contends that they represent a single historical trend towards the natural state of 
diversity, uniqueness and autonomy.16 Havel is concerned with history in so far as 
history can explain the attempt to ground an openness to Being in a particular present. 
The question of Europe’s identity from the perspective of the philosophy of history is 
not Havel’s concern.17 Hence Havel’s philosophy separates from Patočka’s in the 
scope of their concern. The analysis of history which informs Patočka’s critique of 
ideology is not present in Havel. That does not mean that Havel disagrees with 
Patočka; instead Havel frames his thought differently.  
Havel’s thought is no less dense than Patočka’s for the lack of historical analysis. 
Instead, Havel directs his thought directly against the contemporary Czech and world 
situation. Whereas the call to dissent is barely explicit in Patočka, couched in strict 
explication of the phenomenological method, Havel is much more practical than 
Patočka. Havel directs his writing explicitly at whatever situation is most concerning 
                                                          
16 Václav Havel Open Letters, (tr) Paul Wilson  (New York: Vintage Books, 1989), 360. Hereafter 
referred to parenthetically in the text as OL. 
17 Havel, especially Havel the politician, is very interested in the identity of Europe, however, only in 
so far as Europe can be made to be an open society encouraging diversity and freedom. He is a 
supporter of the EU and European integration.  
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to him. For example, in Plato and Europe, Patočka elaborates at length on a 
phenomenological analysis of Plato, Aristotle and Socrates, discussing ways that the 
political example of Socrates represents a life that is open to Being.18 The life then 
that Patočka espouses is, due to the phenomenological distancing from the historical 
situation, a life for all times. Socrates’s example is an example for us. Patočka’s 
concern for life under totalitarian communism in Czechoslovakia is displayed through 
his presentation of the timeless way to live in openness to Being. Havel, in contrast,  
does not need to hide his concern for the Czech situation. Havel is not a strict 
phenomenologist—hence he is not corrupting the phenomenological method in 
writing open letters to Czech leaders, or writing essays on dissident events 
immediately as they happen. In short, Havel grounds his philosophy in an analysis of 
the present. Jean Bethke Elshtain writes that Havel’s philosophy represents an answer 
to a real crisis in responsibility in the present world.19 
This focus on real current events that fills Havel’s writing and speeches is 
criticized by Karel Kosik in his article ‘The Third Munich.’ He argues that concern 
for realpolitik lacks imagination and lumps Havel’s party-free politics in with left and 
right wing ideologies as lacking real imagination.20  I think this is unfair. Kosik makes 
the point that “any politics that considers the cave its field of action sooner or later 
degenerates into a bad routine, into a politics not worthy of the name.”(TM, 154)  I do 
not think that Havel, despite being concerned by the real political events happening 
around him, debases his thought. At all times Havel is careful to step back and 
consider his responsibility in the situation he is responding to. It is an arrow in 
Havel’s quiver that he manages to fuse together his concern for realpolitik and for 
                                                          
18 Jan Patočka, Plato and Europe, (tr) Petr Lom, (CA; Stanford University Press, 2002). 
19 Jean Bethke Elshtain, “Václav Havel on Freedom and Responsibility” in Theory and Practice, 
(ed.)Ian Shapiro and Judith Wagner DeCew (New York: New York University Press, 1995), 478. 
20 Karel Kosik, “The third Munich” trans. Miloslav Bednar in  Telos: A Quarterly Journal of Critical 
Thought. No. 94 (Winter 1993-1994): 154. Hereafter referred to parenthetically in the text as TM. 
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moral theory. Havel argues that when ideology coerces a citizen to live as the 
ideology dictates the moral dimension to life has been lost.21 Havel’s concern is for 
returning the moral dimension to the political. The thrust of ‘The Power of the 
Powerless’ is an attempt to create such a return, despite Kosik’s worries.  
The two main concepts analysed in “The Power of the Powerless” are “living a lie” 
and “living in truth.” When an individual acts according to the dictates of an ideology 
they are living a lie and when they act according to the dictates of morality they are 
living in truth. For Havel, ideology coerces behaviour from individuals. It does so 
through a mechanism of inducing fear; either a fear of punishment or a fear of a loss 
of comfort. (PP, 27) Havel, in this essay, tells the famous story about the greengrocer 
placing a sign in his window proclaiming “Workers of the World unite!” Havel 
questions the greengrocer’s motives in placing the sign in his window: 
 
I think it can safely be assumed that the overwhelming majority of 
shopkeepers never think about the slogans they put in their windows, nor 
do they use them to express their real opinions. That poster was delivered 
to our greengrocer from the enterprise headquarters along with the onions 
and the carrots. He put them all into the window simply because it had 
been done that way for years, because everyone does it, and because it is 
the way it has to be. If he were to refuse, there could be trouble. (PP, 25)  
 
The world that the greengrocer engages in, that is actually lives in, involves a set of 
ritualistic practices that maintain his existence in the social world. Havel intended this 
story to be a critique of socialist governance; however the moral reaches much further 
                                                          
21 Václav Havel, The Power of the Powerless, (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1985), 28. Hereafter referred 
to parenthetically in the text as PP. 
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than this. The actions of the greengrocer, whether it be to perform his job (placing of 
carrots and onions), or his social duty (the sign), for Havel represent a thrown state of 
Being. It is the job and the social structure which determines or coerces action from 
the greengrocer that in a sense determines his identity in the world. As a greengrocer 
it is natural to place the onions and the carrots, yet as a greengrocer there is something 
a little bit odd about the placing of the socialist slogan. 
What is it that compels the greengrocer to place the slogan in his window? Havel 
writes that it is fear. Havel writes that the placing of the slogan is “one of the 
thousands of details that guarantee him a relatively tranquil life ‘in harmony with 
society’, as they say.” (PP, 25) The combined placing of slogans by all citizens 
affirms an ideology. What Havel calls “the aims of life” are put aside in order to live 
in harmony with ideology. (PP, 25) One can already note the similarity to Patočka’s 
pronouncement regarding a life lived for the things of life. Life within the system, for 
Havel, is life within a lie, as one’s actions are being determined by one’s desire to not 
upset a system rather than being determined by a desire to live an authentic life. The 
totalitarian system is created and affirmed through the greengrocer’s actions. He 
shares the guilt, along with all of the other participating citizens, in making normal the 
practice of affirming the totalitarian system. The identity of the greengrocer is tied in 
with his participation in the ideology’s rituals and practices.  
The greengrocer need not even believe the slogans he is placing. Havel identifies 
that the ideology does not care if the greengrocer believes in socialism or not; what is 
important is that he behaves. Havel writes that individuals need not believe the 
mystifications that the system throws up to maintain itself, such as that ideology 
respects human rights and promotes freedom; “but they must behave as though they 
did.” (PP, 31) This bad faith of sorts is living a lie. Through living a lie, the ideology 
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maintains its power. Havel writes that through living a lie, “Individuals confirm the 
system, fulfil the system, make the system, are the system.” (PP, 31)22 The post-
totalitarian world is thus maintained by citizens living a lie and adopting a world of 
appearances in the place of reality in order to maintain a comfortable life free from 
risk. 
For Havel, all citizens are required to live a lie to maintain the power of the 
ideology. The greengrocer is just one of many who ritually place placards in their 
window that mean something very different to the semantic content printed on them. 
The greengrocer’s identification with the placard is not one of socialist solidarity; 
rather the placard, Havel claims, is a sign that announces “I, the greengrocer XY, live 
here and I know what I must do. I behave in the manner expected of me. I can be 
depended upon and am beyond reproach. I am obedient and therefore have the right to 
be left in peace.” (PP, 28) The system requires every citizen to also engage in similar 
rituals which sustain the ideology’s power. It is a point of interest that Havel focuses a 
great deal of thought on the way that ideology distorts language to create a world of 
appearances for living a lie within. This critique of political manipulations of 
language is of critical importance in understanding Havel’s response to ideology.  
Throughout Havel’s writing, language is seen as a political phenomenon. In his 
first major speech, delivered to the union of Czechoslovakian Writers, Havel lambasts 
the organisation which is responsible for allocating funding to literary projects for 
selectively privileging safe and homogenous literary styles, thereby manipulating the 
political sphere with a stagnating force. The speech has been published as the essay, 
‘On Evasive Thinking.’23 The opening of the speech has Havel paraphrase a 
newspaper article that chastises citizens for complaining about window ledges falling 
                                                          
22 Ibid 
23 Havel, Open Letters, 10-24. 
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in the centre of Prague, causing deaths. The writer urges citizens to focus on the good 
points of progress in Czechoslovak living conditions and to illustrate his point he 
notes that women now wear the latest fashions from the streets of Paris rather than the 
grim grey clothes usually associated with socialist homogenising of fashion. The 
problem for Havel is that the author of the article is trying to make citizens forget or 
evade thinking about the very real issue of falling window ledges. The article employs 
language manipulatively to institute what Havel terms ‘evasive thinking.’ Women’s 
fashions have nothing to do with the very real issue of poor building maintenance. For 
Havel, there is a responsibility to use language to point to things as they really are. 
This is not a metaphysical attempt to uncover things in themselves, but to reveal 
things as they appear to us. That language can change the manner of appearance of an 
object is a cause for concern as well as for hope. Hence Havel is distrustful of the 
manipulative nature of language, yet hopeful of a language that can possibly enliven 
the political sphere. I am reminded of an old soviet joke that illustrates Havel’s 
concern. Two farmers are looking at a tractor with a broken wheel, one farmer 
laments, ‘It is useless, the wheel is broken.’ The other farmer retorts, ‘You are looking 
at this all wrong comrade; three wheels are working fine.’24 The suggestion of the 
joke is that simply by changing the language that describes the situation, the 
understanding of the situation changes. 
Havel’s play The Garden Party is a perfect example of his interest in, and critique 
of, language.25 It is a difficult play due to the constant twists and turns of the language 
used by characters. Even characterisation is difficult to fathom as characters take on 
roles of other characters mid-dialogue simply by taking over another character’s 
                                                          
24  Ben Lewis, Hammer and Tickle, Film, Directed by Ben Lewis, 2006. 
25 Václav Havel, “The Garden Party,” trans. George Theiner, in The Garden Party and Other Plays, 
(New York: Grove Press, 1993), 1-52. Hereafter referred to parenthetically in the text as GP 
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conversation. In the opening scene, the protagonist, Hugo Pludek, is playing chess 
with himself whilst his father and mother attempt to give him life advice in the form 
of muddled clichés. As Hugo jumps from side to side of the chess table he is 
repeatedly asked how he is going. Depending on which side of the table he is 
standing, he says either, “badly” or “really well.” The point, at this moment of the 
play, is the deceptive nature of language use: how, to draw on the earlier joke, the 
tractor can either have one broken wheel, or three working ones. Both are correct and 
true statements, and this illustrates the point that simply calling ideology a form of 
lying is too simple. In the play, the audience is positioned to be unsettled by the 
exchange. All the relevant statements are true; none of them indicate what is really 
going on. This is a persistent theme in the play and is well illustrated by an example 
from the text where Hugo is finishing the game of chess. 
Hugo: Super, Mum! (Makes his move) Checkmate! 
Pludek: You lost? 
Hugo: No, I won. 
Mrs Pludek: You won. 
Hugo: No, I lost. (GP, 7)  
Rather than gaining an insight into the nature of any character, it seems that the 
discourse has a stronger presence than the characters. That is that the personalities of 
the characters are lost in multiple meanings and broken clichés.  
For Havel one can lose oneself in cliché. In The Garden Party, a clerk and 
secretary, attempting to have a real conversation after the prompting of a motivational 
inaugurator, ultimately fail to have a meaningful discourse. They give up and return to 
the mechanistic and meaningless use of paradoxes and muddled clichés that every 
character in the play uses. For example, at the prompting of the inaugurator, who 
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keeps appearing and asking how the conversation is going, the two attempt to have a 
conversation about what is immediately before them in the garden.  
Clerk: Look- 
Secretary: Yes? 
Clerk: Look – a sparrow! It’s flying – moss blossoms – meadows are a-
humming – nature! 
Secretary: What? 
Clerk: I say, sparrows are flying – the boss mlossoms – the meadows are 
a-humming – 
Secretary: Oh, I see – nature! 
Clerk: Yes. Well now. You have hair! It’s pretty – gold – like 
buttercrumbs – I mean buttercups – and your nose is like a rose – I’m 
sorry – I mean like a forget-me-not – white – 
Secretary: Look – a sparrow. (GP, 18) 
My reading of this fragment is as a declining move away from the sight of the 
sparrow into a muddled mess of a conversation, with mixed up clichés and a complete 
failure to describe what is seen. The conversation continues in this way until the Clerk 
responds to the Secretary, “The Large Dance floor A is indeed large. I admire the 
courage with which it has been revealed to us.” (GP, 18) The absurdity of this 
conversation should be read within the context that the inaugurator is encouraging 
free conversation to promote motivation at work. Read in this light the whole garden 
party is an ideologically controlled life. People feel they are living, but are mere cogs 
in an ideological machine, which is turned by a false identification by the characters 
with work rather than with what Havel might term the real aims of life. Hence the 
failed attempt to describe the sparrow and the flowers becomes a comfort taken in the 
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ideology’s interpretation of the size of the dance floor, a matter the two had been 
debating for some time previously in a glut of bureaucratic language. Ultimately, as 
the secretary and the clerk identify with the language of their profession, they fail to 
have a real conversation about a phenomenon as it is. Indeed it is as if no specific 
character is even necessary in the play for any role as all it takes to become another 
person is to start speaking for them. The loss of self is taken to an extreme conclusion 
in the final act of the play as Hugo arrives home from his new job, awaiting the return 
of Hugo, asking, as the doorbell rings, if that is himself. Hugo has lost a sense of self 
identity because he has assumed a role in the machine of the ideology which has 
demanded a certain kind of speech and this has taken Hugo away from his authentic 
self.  
Such a reading of the garden party is supported by Paul Trensky, who writes that  
[Havel] shares with other absurdist playwrights the conception of modern 
man’s identity as a vacuum; consequently, man can become anything at 
any time, depending largely on the influences to which he is exposed. All 
his characters are soulless, mechanical creatures who are formed and 
defined only by their environment. The human world is an impersonal 
world in which humans are exchangeable.26 
I share with Trensky the idea that the language of the play, or its manipulation, is 
more important than the characters. For Trensky, words loom as a threatening 
presence in the play and give the impression that they could take over the play and 
their victims. (GPR, 161) The ritual that sustains the ideology is more important than 
the individual performing it. (PP, 30)  The behaviour involved in living a lie acts, 
                                                          
26  Paul Trensky, “Havel’s The Garden Party Revisited” in Critical Essays on Václav Havel, (ed.) 
Marketa Goetz- Stankiewicz and Phyllis Carey, (New York: G.K. Hall & Co., 1999), 161. Hereafter 
referred to parenthetically in the text as GPR.  
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Havel claims, like “a collection of traffic signals and directional signs, giving the 
process shape and structure.” (PP, 32) 
Anything which leads an individual to not follow their ideologically predetermined 
role, the system sees as an attack against itself, like an interruption to the traffic 
signals. (PP, 30) This is where Havel locates the importance of dissent. Dissent is a 
difficult word for Havel: the dissident is a person who lives in truth, but Havel notes 
that not all people who attempt live in truth are called dissidents. (PP, 67-67) Havel 
argues that any activity that “attempt[s]” to create and support the ‘independent life of 
society’ as an articulated expression of ‘living within the truth’ is a meaningful action 
against ideology. (PP, 67) Havel stresses throughout ‘The Power of the Powerless’ 
that living within the truth exposes the mendacious structures of ideology. 
 
[T]he moment someone breaks through in one place, when one person 
cries out, “The emperor is naked!” —when a single person breaks the 
rules of the game, thus exposing it as a game — everything suddenly 
appears in another light and the whole crust seems then to be made of a 
tissue on the point of tearing and disintegrating uncontrollably. (PP, 43)  
 
To put it simply, every act that is not ideological has the potential to deny the 
ideology’s power, as that power is maintained through the behaviour that recognises 
it.  
Havel’s plays are an attempt to live in the truth. They aim to point out to the 
audience that the emperor is naked and thereby shake or rupture the machine. Havel 
never classifies dissent as combat, or war-like behaviour as does Patočka, instead I 
think Havel is too grounded in the world of politics to make such a distinction. Havel 
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understands at all times that the dissident is not tearing down a new world, but rather 
demonstrating the possibility of life lived in other ways. His attitude to the theatre 
demonstrates this. This attitude is spelled out in In Letters to Olga, a collection of 
letters Havel wrote to his first wife Olga Šplíchalová from his imprisonment from 
May 1979 to March 1983.  
In order for the letters to pass the censor, Havel concealed a great deal of thought 
in a cryptic and somewhat Heideggerian language. The musings in the letters range 
from mundane concerns about electricity availability to meditations on the nature of 
responsibility to Being. These letters are great works of dissent, and an attempt at a 
life in truth. I think there is a direct connection between these letters and Patočka’s 
call for action in the Heretical Essays. Of course as Havel was writing from prison, 
the meaning and method of dissent is not a topic that would be able to pass through 
the censors, and so there is no clear statement of the aim of the letters. But there is 
definitely expressed throughout his imprisonment a clear desire to suffer what may, 
rather than become a complicit actor in the ideology’s schemes by admitting guilt to 
some made-up charge. Havel’s letters are a reminder that his actions do stretch 
beyond himself. They stand as a meaningful attempt to find meaning in his suffering, 
in a cause beyond himself, rather than give in to comfort. 
Havel, in Letters to Olga, writes that the theatre allows him to “grasp the world” in 
three meaningful ways. (LO, 289) The first is as a bridge to “interexistentiality;” as 
the theatre creates a community of others whose common participation brings the 
community together as a morally responsible and authentic presence. The second is 
that the theatre has the immediate power of demystifying the world of appearances. 
That is through the depiction of a reality on stage, and through the reflection by the 
audience on their own life’s relationship to the reality of the stage’s life, a mirror is 
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held up to the mendacious elements of the audience’s own life. The ideological and 
therefore inauthentic behaviour coerced by ideology is revealed through the theatre 
and the impetus is then to be authentic with the knowledge that one has not been 
authentic. The third way that the theatre allows Havel to grasp the world is through 
the theatre’s power to represent the importance of structure and order in that it is 
structure and order which organises the performance. I take this to mean that Havel 
understands that dissent or living in truth is not a form of anarchism, that the 
structures of everyday life are to be explored and examined, but not necessarily 
completely abandoned. In other words, the theatre shows that the world of politics is a 
human construction and that the construction itself is very important; but within that 
structure, there needs to be a constant re-examining of the authenticity of behaviour. 
Living in truth is this constant re-examining and is the key maxim of Havel’s 
writings.  
Findlay points out that in Patočka’s analysis of the twentieth century, a tendency 
has emerged, as a symptom of the demobilised war, to identify oneself with a job 
role.27 This is problematic, and a result of his Heideggerian analysis of an increasing 
technologisation of thinking. The human has been, for Patočka, reduced to a mere 
physical force. (HE, 114-15) The problem of the liberal state, with such a reduction in 
mind, is that it offers the illusion of freedom when in reality people are only able to 
choose the roles they perform in the continued war. (CS, 135) Findlay writes that for 
Patočka, in participating in a modern liberal society the individual gives up their 
humanity and becomes disinterested in his or her own being as a problem and a 
question. Havel shares this view in his analysis of technological civilization, but I 
think a key difference emerges. It is a point of major interest to me that Havel uses the 
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example of a greengrocer to make his strongest points about dissent. My interest lies 
in the obvious fact that the greengrocer, even when he becomes a dissident, keeps his 
position as a greengrocer, and loses none of his authenticity for it. The normal and 
everyday are never under full assault from Havel, instead there is a focal difference 
from Patočka which makes, in my view, Havel’s thought the more responsible. For 
Havel, the crisis in responsibility that ideology creates is combatted by being 
responsible for the concrete conditions in which one lives. 
A crisis in responsibility (the “intrinsic responsibility that man has to and 
for the world”) is a crisis in human identity and human integrity. To 
assume “full responsibility” is not to lapse into dour moralism, nor to 
universalise a kind of giddy and boundaryless compassion, but to take up 
the very specific and concrete burdens of one’s time and place.28 
 
For Havel the everyday must continue, it would just be better if people were more 
existentially honest about their behaviour. Havel believes in an authentic existence 
which is outside and apart from ideology. For Havel, this identity is expressed 
politically. Havel writes, 
 
…living within the truth has more than a mere existential dimension 
(returning humanity to its inherent nature), or a noetic dimension 
(revealing reality as it is), or a moral dimension (setting an example for 
others). It also has an unambiguous political dimension. If the main pillar 
of the system is living a lie, then it is not surprising that the fundamental 
threat to it is living the truth. (PP, 40)  
                                                          
28 Jean Bethke Elshtain “A Man for this Season,” Perspectives on Political Science 92, vol 21, iss 4, 
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Havel is stressing the particular political importance of dissent. Living in truth is not 
only being existentially honest but a means of upsetting the ideology — of shaking it.  
In “The Power of the Powerless” Havel laments the way in which people 
deliberately live a lie in order to avoid discomfort at the hands of the ideology. The 
“aims of life”, which for Havel is the search for authentic being, are ignored in favour 
of coerced behaviour and identity through the fearful intimidations of the ideology. 
Havel has obviously been influenced by Patočka in developing this thought, I am not 
saying anything new there. However, in spelling out how Havel has employed 
Patočka and moved beyond him in many regards in concerning himself with 
ideological manipulations of language in the public sphere and by focusing the shaken  
on the current concrete political moment, I have spelled out the important and unique 
contribution of Havel. Havel’s legacy lies not only in his being a moral character who 
attempted to live within the truth; but also in his thinking on how an individual or 
group can confront ideology.  
This confrontation, the kernel of Havel’s political philosophy, lies in being 
existentially honest with oneself. When citizens are existentially honest about their 
behaviour, after exposing their actions and thoughts to inquiry to see if ideological 
apparatus structure or coerce that action or thought, then the power of an ideology is 
shaken. For havel, ideology is only sustained by the behaviour of those who chose 
comfort rather than risk for honesty. Living in truth, which is living so that one does 
not become subsumed by the rituals and clichés that mark life in a lie, is a powerful 
political tool for encouraging, in Havel’s mind, an authentic and free political 
situation. The existential honesty of living in truth is different in scope from Patočka 
shaken who are more orientated towards Patočka’s philosophy of history; however, as 
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I have demonstrated this is a credit to Havel for offering a political philosophy that is 
better able to capture the concrete moment, to show and then upset any ideological 
power at play in that moment’s appearance. 
 
 
